he hypothesis that cognition, and the mind more generally, might extend beyond the margins of the body came to prominence in the 1990s. The most oft-cited source is Andy Clark and David Chalmers' celebrated 1998 article 'The Extended Mind'. The six papers in this issue of Essays in Philosophy explore various aspects of the extended mind thesis and related ideas. While all but one of them discuss Clark and Chalmers' article, and all are sympathetic to the extended mind movement, the later papers in the issue are increasingly of the opinion that it is time for the movement to abandon that early framework.
MIND AND COGNITION: EXTENDED OR EMBEDDED?
The pivotal example in Clark and Chalmers' article is now one of the most well-known thought experiments in T philosophy: Otto, the Alzheimer's patient who uses his notebook to help him navigate the world-and in particular, to navigate his way to the Museum of Modern Art. The notebook itself, Clark and Chalmers argued, contains some of Otto's beliefs. One suspects that the popularity of the example was buoyed by the commercial introduction of smartphones (the first iPhone was released in 2007). Many people now find it increasingly easy to consider the electronic device in their pocket as an extension of their mind.
However, there has also been plenty of resistance (to Clark and Chalmers' claim; less so to smartphones, which are now found in the pockets of more than half of the US population). One prominent challenge, from Robert Rupert, says that there is no reason to prefer the thesis that the mind extends into the organism's environment over the weaker thesis that it is merely embedded within the environment. The latter thesis accepts the deep dependence of cognition on external resources, but denies that such resources partly constitute that cognition. Our first two papers both defend the extended mind thesis against this challenge.
Andrew Winters addresses the particular objection that the extended mind thesis, unlike the embedded alternative, cannot explain an apparent asymmetry between the organism and its external resources. For example, if we separate Otto from his notebook, only one of the two resulting entities is minded. Otto remains a cognitive system (albeit a debilitated one), and thus will still engage in many of the activities typical of such systems; whereas the notebook will be inert. Hutto and Myin argue that representation, rather than being a universal feature of mentality, is merely an outgrowth of the linguistic abilities of cognitively sophisticated creatures, such as ourselves. Mentality in its basic form consists in an organism's interactions with its environment; and moreover, the environment is not secondary to the brain, but rather contributes in an equal partnership with it. Zavota suggests that Merleau-Ponty came to occupy an even more radical position: that the brain and the environment are not equal partners, but form a fundamental unity in which the contributions of the one and the other cannot be distinguished. This unity Merleau-Ponty called "flesh", and in The Visible and the Invisible he was setting out an "ontology of the flesh" in which perceiver and perceived are so deeply interconnected as to be reversible.
MENTAL WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN!
In a paper which has notable resonances with Zavota's, Makoto Kureha explores John Dewey's theory of cognition as an alternative to the extended mind thesis. While proponents of that thesis often cite Dewey as a forerunner, in "The Unbounded and Social Mind: Dewey on the Locus of Mind" Kureha argues that they have misunderstood him. The extended mind thesis says that the mind, although centered on individual organisms, extends some distance outward from those organisms into the environment. According to Kureha, Dewey would reject two key assumptions of this thesis: that the mind belongs to individuals, and (relatedly) that it has a boundary. Kureha suggests that extended mind theorists share these assumptions with their avowed opponents, internalists-and that they therefore cannot offer an explanatorily superior alternative to internalism. Dewey, by contrast, urges us not to think of mind as an entity with a spatial location, but as an activity which is united with matter and life in a continuous process. (It holding that the mind is sequestered within the boundary of the skin. And WEIRD philosophers are no exception (indeed I would add, in all seriousness, that in them the WEIRDness is exacerbated). For this reason, the trajectory of the extended mind movement has been a procedure of gradually and fitfully releasing the mind from the spatial strictures of the brain. Fritzman and Thornburg urge that we must abandon this laborious procedure and begin with the premise of group cognition. For one thing, they observe, Hegel taught us that individuals and groups are mutually codetermining. And for another, this is the only way to counteract our WEIRD presuppositions.
